No one outside Britain or Argentina can truly grasp the hatred still simmering between these two nations, hatred that flares up in the most absurd places, even on a football pitch during the World Cup. And it all goes back to a war that should never have happened. In 1982, Argentina’s military junta was collapsing. Its popularity was in freefall, its economy a disaster.
Desperate men do desperate things, and General Galtieri and his generals decided a foreign adventure would unite the country behind them. What better way to distract a suffering population than to snatch the Falkland Islands, a barren British outpost in the South Atlantic that had barely been garrisoned for decades, along with the territory of South Georgia? They miscalculated. They thought Britain would weep and cave, as it had done so often before.
But they didn’t count on Margaret Thatcher, a prime minister whose own popularity was plummeting. She saw the invasion as her salvation too. She would not negotiate. She would send a task force.
National honor was at stake, and the British public, galvanized by a sense of righteous fury, backed her. The British fleet sailed 8,000 miles. It was a brutal campaign. The Argentine pilots, especially in their air force and naval aviation, fought with astonishing bravery.
They sank several Royal Navy warships and damaged many more. The land battles were fought in freezing, hostile weather against a well-entrenched enemy. But the training and spirit of the British troops won through in a series of mountain engagements that led to the recapture of Port Stanley. On the 14th of June, 1982, just 74 days after the attack, Argentina surrendered.
The question has haunted both nations ever since: will Argentina try to take the Falklands again? Argentine presidents have never stopped pressing their claim. British prime ministers have always promised to defend the islands with force. But the truth on the ground is far more complicated than the political grandstanding suggests.
Is Argentina even capable of invading? And is Britain, this time, even capable of getting the islands back? For Argentina to succeed today, it needs three things: local air superiority, local naval superiority, and the ability to land an invasion force. In 1982, air superiority wasn’t a problem for Argentina.
The Falklands had no military aircraft based on them. The Argentine armada could approach freely. Today, that’s different. Britain built RAF Mount Pleasant after the war, 35 miles southwest of Port Stanley.
It has a permanent flight of four Eurofighter Typhoons, extremely capable aircraft that would be used to control the skies and attack any approaching invasion fleet. In 1982, Argentina had a huge air force. It had about 45 Skyhawks, 30 to 35 Israeli IAI Daggers, up to 20 Mirage IIIs, and 10 Canberra bombers. Today, its only modern jets capable of reaching the Falklands and fighting the RAF are six second-hand F-16s bought from Denmark, with a further 12 on order.
And these F-16s have massive problems. British ground-based radar can see them before they see the British, giving the Typhoons time to respond. The airbase is also protected by the extremely modern Sky Sabre surface-to-air missile system. And the four Typhoons would dominate the much older F-16s.
It is very doubtful that Argentina could win local air superiority. Could the Argentine Navy help? In 1982, it had a naval air arm that did real damage. Super Étendard fighter-bombers armed with Exocet anti-ship missiles flew from bases in Argentina, sinking the HMS Sheffield and causing chaos among the British fleet.
Incredibly, in 2026, Argentina still operates Super Étendards in the same anti-ship role. But their entire fleet of about 15 aircraft is grounded. They lack spare parts, which ironically they normally get from Britain. In 1982, the Argentine Navy also had an old World War II-era British aircraft carrier, the ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, with eight A-4Q Skyhawks aboard.
Not anymore. Argentina has no aircraft carriers in 2026. So, what about local naval superiority? Here’s the uncomfortable truth.
Argentina could conceivably overwhelm the Royal Navy assets around the Falklands today. In 1982, the only British naval vessel in the South Atlantic was the ice patrol ship HMS Endurance, which stayed well out of the fighting. Today, the Royal Navy has two vessels in the region. The guard ship is HMS Medway, a 2,000-ton River-class offshore patrol vessel.
She carries one 30mm cannon, two general-purpose machine guns, and two . 50 caliber machine guns. No missiles. The other is the ice patrol ship HMS Protector, armed with four .
50 caliber machine guns and five GPMGs. These ships would stay well away from Argentine destroyers and corvettes. Argentina has the local naval supremacy. The final problem for Argentina is transportation.
In 1982, it had an impressive fleet: the aircraft carrier, the light cruiser General Belgrano, two modern Type 42 destroyers, four older American destroyers, three Drummond-class corvettes, two diesel-electric submarines, an amphibious landing ship, a large icebreaker, and a supply ship. In 2026, the Argentine Navy is a shadow of that. No carrier, no functioning submarines, three destroyers, six corvettes, one amphibious support ship, one tanker, and an old icebreaker. If the Argentine Air Force failed to destroy the British Typhoons, it’s hard to see how any invasion force could get near the islands.
And even if they landed troops, those ships would be attacked just as the British ships were in 1982. But for argument’s sake, let’s say Argentina manages to overwhelm the British defenses and land troops. Their objective would be Port Stanley and the military bases around it. Unlike in 1982, Britain has a considerable garrison: up to 1,500 personnel.
This includes a Rifleman infantry company from the 5th Battalion of The Rifles, a squadron from the Royal Engineers, a squadron from the Royal Logistic Corps, and the Falkland Islands Defense Force, a locally recruited reserve unit of about 40 trained light infantry. All told, this makes at least four companies of fighting troops, much more than Argentina faced in 1982. They could make a prolonged defense until help arrives. And that help would have to be another British task force.
And here’s where things get really difficult for London. The once mighty Royal Navy has been run down by successive governments to a tiny fraction of its former self. In 1982, the task force to retake the Falklands consisted of two aircraft carriers, eight destroyers, 15 frigates, two landing ships, and six submarines, plus 22 support vessels. It had 38 Sea Harriers and RAF Harrier GR3s, and 163 helicopters.
Putting together a British task force a fraction of that size in 2026 would be extremely challenging. We still have two aircraft carriers, but they are mechanically unreliable. I think if one was sent, it would probably break down long before reaching the South Atlantic. Protecting it would be very hard because we have virtually no functioning escort ships left.
In 1982, we sent eight destroyers and 15 frigates. Today, we have six destroyers and five knackered frigates, and they seem to spend most of their time in refit. We wouldn’t need to worry about Argentine submarines because Argentina has none working. But neither does Britain.
All of our hunter-killer submarines are currently laid up in dockyards under maintenance. To carry troops south and land them would require specialized amphibious warfare ships. But both of those were recently withdrawn from service, due to be sold or scrapped, leaving just three Bay-class landing ships. The key point is that any British aircraft carrier would probably break down long before reaching the South Atlantic.
Without the carrier and its air group, there would be absolutely no point in attempting to retake the Falklands. You’d have no air cover. This is a serious weakness. Also, the F-35Bs on the carriers are delicate planes requiring extensive maintenance.
They would not do well in harsh South Atlantic conditions. So, to be honest, any move Argentina makes on the Falklands today could probably be contained by the British forces already there. However, Argentina is expanding its military capabilities. The only way I can see Argentina militarily taking the Falklands again is if they could neutralize the RAF Typhoons at Mount Pleasant or put the runway out of commission.
Right now, Argentina has six F-16s, but will eventually have 18. And the US recently announced it is selling them two KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft to supplement two existing refuelers. With better tankers, Argentine F-16s can stay airborne longer, loitering and harassing like Russian aircraft do around British airspace in Europe. Could an all-out attack by 18 F-16s overcome the four Typhoons based there?
This is a question in itself. When you factor in British naval weakness and Argentina’s naval supremacy in the region, could such a coordinated air attack overwhelm the small RAF contingent and be followed up by a naval landing? Argentina is currently negotiating to purchase three new submarines, amphibious warfare ships, and two new multi-role frigates, probably from France or Denmark. It doesn’t seem beyond the realms of possibility that in the future, perhaps the near future, Argentina could make a landing on the oil-rich Falkland Islands.
And if a rejuvenated Argentine Air Force and Navy successfully landed troops, Britain could do almost nothing about it. The Royal Navy is too small, its ships too unreliable or elderly to send a second task force. The only way to prevent a landing is to immediately beef up British defenses in the region, particularly naval and air force assets. But I won’t hold my breath.
If Argentina was to make a move on the Falklands, the naval situation appears to be in their favor. Largely because they know, like the rest of the world knows, just how militarily impotent Great Britain has become through politicians’ deliberate neglect of national defense. These are all complex questions.
I’d be very interested to see what you have to say about all of this.
