The Führer was dead, and Heinrich Himmler had just discovered that Hitler had not named him successor. Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz now led what remained of the Third Reich, and Himmler, wounded by the betrayal, refused to accept his diminished role. He became a pushy, unwanted presence at Dönitz’s court in Plön, and when the shock had settled, he asked the new Reich President for a position—specifically, to be his second-in-command, effectively his prime minister. Dönitz told him it was impossible, but he had to tread carefully.
The former Reichsführer SS still commanded the loyalty of thousands of SS troops in Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark, the western Netherlands, and Norway. Himmler had enough muscle to forcibly remove Dönitz if he chose, but again, he shrank from violence. Instead, he tried to weasel his way into a legitimate position. Dönitz humored him.
Himmler forced Dönitz to remove Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, a personal enemy of his, replacing him with Count von Krosigk. He believed Dönitz had no understanding of his secret maneuvers toward the Western Allies. Himmler wanted to end the war with himself in charge of Germany, under Western Allied protection. And British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had indeed been playing games with Himmler for months.
On the 1st of May 1945, Churchill sent a top-secret telegram to Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, via MI6 chief Sir Stewart Menzies, saying he was confident they might be only a day or two from surrender on all fronts—through Himmler. The same day, SS-Obergruppenführer Hans Prützmann, who had been responsible for setting up the Werewolf Nazi guerrilla campaign in Germany, arrived at Dönitz’s headquarters as Himmler’s personal representative. Himmler was fixated on holding the Alpine regions of Bavaria and Austria. He radioed SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger, commander of the remnants of the 13th SS Army Corps there, ordering him to collect the SS units and lead them himself.
“Defend the entrances to the Alps for me,” he commanded. That order only made sense in light of his eventual move south. The Alpine Redoubt was meant to be a last refuge for the SS—and a nightmare for the Americans to capture. In reality, it was largely a propaganda exercise.
On the 2nd of May, Himmler contacted General August von Ringel, commanding Army Group Ostmark in Austria and western Czechoslovakia, with the same exhortation. He also countered the idea that he had betrayed the Führer, blaming “greatest intrigue by Martin Bormann from Berlin” for what had happened. Dönitz was a realist. He had his own reasons for continuing the war operations, particularly Operation Hannibal, a naval rescue of German soldiers and civilians trapped on the Baltic coast from the vengeful Soviets.
But he was ready to negotiate a surrender slowly. In a meeting on the 2nd, he said, “The military situation is hopeless. At this stage, the main objective of the government must be to save as many German people from annihilation by the Bolsheviks. ”
At 11:50 that morning, Dönitz met with von Krosigk, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, head of the armed forces, and Himmler.
The military situation in Schleswig-Holstein was rated good; supplies could last weeks. At 1:10, a further meeting with Himmler brought news that the Gauleiter of Hamburg, Karl Kaufmann, wanted permission to surrender the city to the British, declaring it an open city to spare the population. Dönitz and Himmler agreed. That evening, with British forces approaching Plön, Dönitz began evacuating his headquarters to the Naval Academy at Flensburg-Mürwik, close to the Danish border.
Himmler made changes to his own HQ. His adjutant, Heinz Macher, was ordered to command a personal protection detail of 15 hand-picked SS men, as his 600-man guard battalion had been lost in Berlin, which surrendered that day. Before Dönitz left, Himmler discussed at length the possibility of an armistice with the Western Allies, and whether it was wise for him to remain in the new government. Dönitz wanted him gone, but had to humor him to prevent a military coup.
Later, Himmler sat in the Führer’s car in Brunsholm, 11 kilometers west of Flensburg, reviewing the fanatical 12th SS Panzergrenadier Training and Replacement Battalion. Dönitz was not master of his own house; Himmler was effectively a shadow government. On the night of May 2nd to 3rd, Himmler drove to Flensburg, dodging Allied air attacks. He gave a lift to SS-Obergruppenführer Dr.
Werner Best, the civil administrator of German-occupied Denmark. During the long journey, Himmler filled Best in on recent events. “In recent times, the Führer was no longer the same,” he said. He blamed Bormann and the Armed Forces High Command for using their influence against him.
He said, “If I could just talk to Eisenhower for two hours, then I would convince him that together we need to go against the Russians. ”
Best watched Himmler closely during the drive. He was nervous, absent-minded, moody, despondent. “One could say that he had had an exciting and exhausting time behind him,” Best observed.
“Before him he saw a way out, but no job. ” Best was sure that if they had been surprised by enemy troops that night, Himmler would have taken poison. Himmler moved into a new headquarters that night, a requisitioned farm at Lorenzen, ten kilometers southeast of Flensburg. It would be his base until around the 7th of May.
Interestingly, the location became a focus of a major British search after his death, because one of his bodyguards, Wilhelm Walter, told his interrogators that Himmler had buried files there. The farmer and his daughter were intensively interrogated, but the files were never found—they had been moved. On the 3rd of May, Himmler held meetings with high SS officials. He met SS-Standartenführer Hans Hingst, police president of Flensburg, and the chief of the Order Police, Alfred Wünnenberg, who admitted any defense of the region was now futile.
Then, at Dönitz’s headquarters, he discussed the Bohemia question—western Czechoslovakia still in German hands. Himmler was interested in transferring the new government to Bohemia. That evening, he gatecrashed a meeting between Dönitz and the German leaders in Norway, Reichskommissar Josef Terboven and General Franz Böhme, the military commander there. Böhme reported that Norway, home to a 350,000-man garrison and several U-boat bases, remained quiet.
Himmler’s spy chief, Walter Schellenberg, suggested offering to surrender Norway to Sweden, with the German force interned. Himmler said Sweden was already willing. Afterwards, Himmler sent out orders for the remnants of the concentration camp inspectorate to report to him at Flensburg. He met Rudolf Höss, the former commandant of Auschwitz-Birkenau, for the last time.
Höss said Himmler was “hale and hearty and in the best of humor. ” Himmler ordered the senior camp officers to disguise themselves as army NCOs and cross into Denmark that night as military stragglers. He shook each of them by the hand. Höss had the impression Himmler intended to go into hiding, perhaps in Sweden.
Himmler told SS-Gruppenführer Richard Glücks and Standartenführer Gerhard Maurer that he was getting in touch with Montgomery to arrange an armistice with the Western Allies so he could carry on the war against Russia, and advised these war criminals to go into hiding for some weeks, by which time, he said, all grievances would be forgotten. He directed that all the concentration camp administrative leaders obtain fake papers and go their own ways. On the 4th of May, Generalfeldmarschall Ernst Busch, commanding Army Group Northwest, set up headquarters at a farm in Kollerup with 350 personnel. Himmler immediately visited.
Incredibly, during their discussions, Himmler demanded from Busch an army paybook he could use. Busch refused. Himmler was clearly thinking about fleeing in the near future. At 12:25, Dönitz, Himmler, von Krosigk, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, and Albert Speer discussed ongoing surrender negotiations with Montgomery.
Speer later revealed that despite Flensburg being threatened by the advancing British, Dönitz refused to leave. He also said Himmler was thinking about flying to Prague, where he had a power base. Himmler’s Focke-Wulf Condor was being held for such an eventuality at Neumünster Airfield. At 6:30 p.
m. , General-Admiral von Friedeburg signed the surrender document in a tent at Montgomery’s Lüneburg Heath headquarters. This ended German resistance in the Netherlands, northwestern Germany, Frisian Islands, and Denmark. The capitulation took effect at 8:00 a.
m. on the 5th of May, 1945. Himmler then met General Böhme again, telling him he had retained all his officers of state, contrary to reports that Hitler had stripped him of them. He said he had also taken over responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.
That morning, a government reshuffle was undertaken in Flensburg. Schellenberg was appointed envoy with plenary powers to conduct peace negotiations. In England, Bletchley Park intercepted a radio message from Keitel concerning the treatment of POWs: in agreement with Himmler, all prisoners of war, foreign workers, and concentration camp inmates were to be handed over to the enemy under a small guard. The 5th of May also saw Himmler’s last conference with his Obergruppenführers—his cabal of lieutenant generals.
Thirteen were present. Himmler told them Bormann had admonished him for initiating peace parleys without authority. His intention, he said, was to establish a reformed government in Schleswig-Holstein, where it could negotiate peace with the Western powers on its own territory. One of those present, Maximilian von Herff, later said all were unanimous that Himmler was unduly optimistic.
Himmler seemed very positive that Schleswig-Holstein would remain as a refuge where the government could work, with the SS as a police force to prove their worth to the English. Hans Jüttner recalled that Himmler stated he had no intention to end his own life or be killed—on the contrary, he was full of vitality. All he wanted was an interview with Montgomery. Several others got the impression Himmler intended to strike a bargain with the Western Allies to save his own life, and they thought he was sure to succeed.
At this point, a document appeared that is still discussed today: a letter from Himmler to Field Marshal Montgomery. Himmler’s adjutant Heinz Macher saw it on the 5th or 6th of May. The order was that it be handed to Keitel or Jodl for delivery to Montgomery by military courier. Macher recalled its general contents: Himmler recognized he was defeated and Montgomery was the victor, but many things remained to be done in re-establishing order in Germany.
In view of this, and the possible help Himmler could give, a meeting was suggested. Werner Grothmann added that Himmler wanted to place the Waffen SS at Montgomery’s disposal for the fight against the Soviet Union. On the 6th of May, Bletchley Park intercepted a message from Himmler to Ernst Kaltenbrunner ordering the King of the Belgians, held hostage until then, to be released at the Swiss frontier—another gesture toward the Allies. At 5:00 that afternoon, Dönitz formally dispensed with Himmler’s services.
He was no longer recognized as Minister of the Interior, Chief of the Replacement Army, or Head of the Police. Dönitz felt confident enough that surrender was imminent. Any pretense of flattering Himmler could now end. Otto Ohlendorf said that after this meeting, Himmler gave the impression he wanted to disappear and go underground.
Though he still had a 150-man headquarters staff, four large fuel cars, a radio truck, and traveled constantly with armed guards and aides. That afternoon, Colonel General Jodl arrived at Eisenhower’s headquarters at Reims to sign the capitulation documents for all German forces in Europe. Before leaving, Himmler had asked Jodl for advice on what to do next—whether he should fly by night fighter to southern Germany, where a considerable number of SS troops remained under arms. Himmler transferred his headquarters to another farm near Satrup, just south of Flensburg, closer to Busch’s headquarters.
On the 7th at 2:21 a. m. , Jodl signed the unconditional surrender at Eisenhower’s headquarters. It would become effective the following day.
On the 8th of May, Dönitz made a radio address to the German people announcing the end of the war. Himmler signed an order to all troops under his command on the Western Front to surrender. He retained an escort unit of about twelve officers and men under Standartenführer Josef Kiermaier, and four large cars. At some point, Himmler gave his letter addressed to Montgomery to Jodl for delivery to the German liaison officer at Montgomery’s headquarters, General Eberhard Kinzel.
Albert Speer later said at Nuremberg that the letter included a plea for safe conduct, and that if Himmler were taken prisoner, he expected the rights of a high-ranking general under the laws of war. The letter was never delivered. Jodl later admitted he had torn it up. Himmler’s plan now was to go into hiding while awaiting a reply.
Macher said that on the 9th or 10th of May, he received orders from Himmler to accompany him to the Harz Mountains as a bodyguard. On the 10th of May, Himmler’s party—the Reichsführer and just over a dozen officers and men, extremely well armed—drove south in four large fuel cars. Since no reply had come from Montgomery, Himmler, unaware that Jodl had destroyed the precious letter, decided to move to remain at liberty, to be able to talk to Montgomery as a free man, not a captive. He stayed in contact with some of his men in the Flensburg area, checking daily for a reply.
He was heading to the isolated Harz Mountains region of central Germany, where he had a large stash of gold coins and foreign currency hidden in a local bank—enough to finance his further evasion south if needed. If Montgomery refused to reply, he planned to move down to the Alps and was determined to stay out of Allied hands as long as possible. He had a very well-thought-out plan of escape and survival before he left his last headquarters at Satrup on the 10th of May.
