The German occupiers had no shortage of willing Dutch collaborators. Yet, when they needed a figurehead to lead the most powerful collaborationist movement in the Netherlands, they didn’t pick the most fanatical Nazi. They picked Anton Mussert, a man many of them privately despised. Mussert’s National Socialist Movement, the NSB, wasn’t the only fascist group in the country.
Two days after the NSB was founded in December 1931, a rival party emerged called the NSNAP, led by Ernst Herman Ritter von Rappard. This group was fanatically anti-Semitic and wanted to turn the Netherlands into a province of Germany, mirroring Hitler’s own ambitions. Its entire ideology revolved around hatred of Jews, seeing a Jewish conspiracy behind every problem. By 1932, the party had already splintered into three competing micro-parties, all using the same name.
German authorities eventually forced these factions to merge into the NSB in late 1940 and 1941. There was also the Black Front, a Christian fascist movement led by Arnold Meijer. It remained marginal and was ultimately banned by the occupiers. So why did the Germans settle on Mussert?
The NSB presented itself not as a party, but as a movement. Although its name included “National Socialism,” Mussert claimed the label didn’t matter. It was about substance, not names. While the party initially claimed it wasn’t anti-Jewish, it increasingly adopted German-style anti-Semitism as Hitler’s power grew.
Even before the war, the NSB was accused of treason. Its uniforms, marches, and drills were seen as un-Dutch. As it aligned itself with Germany, it was forced to defend Hitler’s decisions. While some Dutch people were attracted to it, far more were repelled.
The party’s ideological vagueness and academic propaganda failed to win over the working class. Catholics stayed loyal to their own parties, Protestants feared for their sovereignty, and liberals were shocked by its anti-democratic stance. Before the war, the NSB never became a major force in Dutch politics. That all changed when Germany conquered the Netherlands.
The NSB had about 27,000 members at the time, a number that would soon swell. The departure of the Queen and the government strengthened pro-German feelings among members. Mussert was allowed to give a speech in Lunteren declaring that the Netherlands was not at war with Germany, but the Germans refused to let him broadcast it. The occupiers said they would leave the NSB alone, but Mussert was uneasy.
He feared Germany aimed for the complete annexation of his country. His worries were justified. On June 9th, 1940, Hitler ordered Mussert to form Regiment Westland, a unit in which Dutch and Flemish volunteers would serve as Waffen-SS soldiers. During those early months, it wasn’t Mussert who enjoyed the most German support.
It was his party rival, Meinoud Rost van Tonningen. The appointed Reichskommissar, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, wanted National Socialism to be visible in public life. NSB members were allowed to wear uniforms again and organize marches. They ignored existing laws and acted provocatively, provoking widespread anger.
This anger erupted in the Carnation Protest on June 29th, 1940, when Dutch citizens showed support for the royal family. NSB members reacted aggressively, leading to street fights. In the following months, resistance was small-scale but persistent. NSB members were insulted, spat upon, and had their homes and propaganda vandalized.
In July 1940, the Dutch Union was founded as a permitted political movement meant to counter the NSB. It protected Dutch identity and cooperated with the occupiers without giving the NSB full control. With 800 members, it became the largest political organization in the country, a way for people to express patriotism without joining the resistance. The Germans banned it in December 1941.
Around that time, Mussert swore an oath of loyalty to Hitler as Germanic Führer. NSB members themselves were frustrated. They wanted more power in the streets but were still restricted by police and German oversight. They became more violent to prove they were the occupiers’ best partners.
A man carrying a Dutch Union flag was pulled off his bike and beaten. Schoolboys were beaten for throwing snowballs. Minor incidents escalated quickly. The WA, the NSB’s paramilitary wing, played a major role.
They organized large marches to show their power, deliberately passing through Jewish neighborhoods. By the end of 1940, violence increasingly targeted Jewish people. WA members put up signs reading “Jews not allowed. ” German authorities tolerated this behavior.
WA members were given a privileged position, often allowed to march without permission and protected by police, while their opponents were quickly arrested. The WA aspired to become an official police force, but the Germans refused. Eventually, the WA was sidelined. Many of its members joined the Waffen SS to fight on the Eastern Front.
In 1943, the remaining members joined the Landwacht, which later became the Landstorm Nederland. By then, major disagreements had erupted within the NSB. Mussert advocated for a Germanic federation in which the Netherlands would retain its autonomy. Other prominent members, like Henk Feldmeijer and Rost van Tonningen, supported a Germanic Reich in which the Netherlands would be fully absorbed.
Mussert fervently hoped Hitler would accept his idea of a federation. He wanted to later claim he had saved the Netherlands from annexation. He was willing to make concessions, recognizing Hitler as leader, obeying his orders, and accepting a Dutch SS as part of the NSB. Although this Dutch SS was nominally part of the NSB, it functioned as a subsidiary of the German Allgemeine SS.
In their eyes, the NSB was a half-hearted attempt at unifying the Germanic people. They wanted to integrate all Germanic races into one state and opposed Mussert’s federation. Any reluctance toward integration was seen as separatism, treason. The Dutch SS members saw Mussert as a cowardly opportunist, a fraud.
They considered themselves the real anti-Semites and anti-communists. The leader of the Dutch SS was Feldmeijer, who aligned more with Himmler and his deputy in the Netherlands, Hanns Albin Rauter, than with Mussert. In May 1942, the Dutch SS swore an oath to Hitler, formally confirming this alignment. To satisfy the Germans, Mussert encouraged his members to serve in the Waffen SS.
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Germans wanted to send a Dutch unit to the Eastern Front, the Volunteer Legion Netherlands. Mussert was willing to arrange it. He hoped it would form the basis of a future Dutch army within his envisioned federation. While Mussert tried to maintain political control as the leader of the Dutch people, he was constantly undermined by Rost van Tonningen and the SS.
The Germans exploited this rivalry. They used Mussert as a formal figurehead to keep the population calm, while through Rost van Tonningen and the Dutch SS, they organized the actual Nazification and economic exploitation of the country. Mussert’s vision proved to be an illusion. The real power holders in Berlin had Rost van Tonningen’s Germanic state as their goal.
The Germans accepted Mussert primarily for practical reasons, not because they considered him the best National Socialist. Many Nazi leaders saw him as weak, indecisive, and less ideologically pure than someone like Rost van Tonningen. But Mussert was useful. He was well-known from before the war and had an existing organization with followers.
For the Germans, stability was crucial. They wanted order and no power struggles within the collaborationist movement. Replacing Mussert immediately could have caused division and chaos. The Germans also found it useful that Mussert appeared more moderate.
His idea of a federation aligned better with Dutch feelings of national pride than outright absorption. It made it easier to gain support and provoke less resistance. Rost van Tonningen was more radical and less suitable as a public face. Yet the Germans gave him important positions, keeping him close to power without putting him directly above Mussert.
They could use both men, Mussert the visible leader, and Rost van Tonningen the ideologically reliable force behind the scenes. As for the loudmouths of the NSNAP like Von Rappard, the occupiers had no use for them at all.
